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1. INTRODUCTION

State and federal courts of this country face an increasing
caseload, due in large part to the increase of criminal cases, both in
the adult system and in the juvenile system.' In addition to the increase in juvenile crime, there is an increased desire to certify juveniles to stand trial as adults for violent crimes. This takes a toll on
the civil cases pending on various state and federal dockets.
To meet this increase in caseloads, the judicial system must
have more judges and judicial officers, or, in the alternative, must
find a more effective way to dispose of the cases on hand, particularly the civil cases. Due to budgetary concerns in state legislatures,
it is the more likely scenario that the judicial system will have to
continue to address the increased number of case filings under the
"status quo" number of judges. Some form of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") may provide the answer, or at least some relief,
to the overburdened court system. Alternative dispute resolution
includes a variety of settlement procedures designed to resolve disputes. The primary purpose is to reduce court dockets by increasing the likelihood of settlement. 2 ADR procedures may be provided by a court or a private ADR provider. The principal goals
are to relieve court congestion, lessen costs, facilitate access to justice, and, in some instances, provide a measure of justice superior
to that obtainable at a full-scale trial.
One ADR procedure in particular shows great promise in resolving the cases currently pending before overburdened courts.
The summary
jury trial ("SJT"), a relatively recent ADR develop5
ment, is very different from the more standard arbitration and
1. See Bobby Marzine Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial,
63 TEMPLE L. REV. 799, 799 (1990); Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial Ending the Guessing Game: An Objective Means of Case Evaluation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON

Disp. RESOL. 621, 621 (1993); Glenn Newman, The SummaryJury Trialas a Method of
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 177, 177-79 (1990).
2. See Newman, supra note 1, at 177.
3. See Harges, supra note 1, at 799.
4. See id.
5. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 622. Judge Lambros notes that passage of
the Speedy Trial Act in 1980 led to priority being given to criminal cases. See id.
This led to a backlog of civil cases. See id. As a result, Judge Lambros developed
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mediation methods. Summary jury trial is "simply a jury trial without the presentation of live evidence."6 SJTs involve attorney presentations of the evidence in front of a jury, as well as opening and
closing arguments. In some cases, live witnesses may be heard as
well. The jury then "deliberates" and provides a "verdict" to the
parties. After hearing the jury verdict, the judge and the attorneys-and in some cases the parties themselves-may ask the jury
questions about why they found the way they did, or why they believed certain facts and evidence over others. While most often
SJTs are nonbinding, the use of a panel of peers has proved helpful
to change the minds of litigants opposed to settlement and thus resolve cases in a more efficient and expeditious manner.
However, before judges employ SJTs, they ought to have an
answer to the question "Is this an efficient use of either my time or
the time of magistrates, referees, or court-appointed neutrals?"
Federal Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, a renowned
scholar in the field of law and economics, suggested in 1986 that we
needed a "dose of social science" to answer that question.7 In this
article, I attempt to supply a "dose" of statistical social science to
find an answer to this important question.
First, in Part II, this article briefly reviews the various types of
ADR, focusing in particular on the format and use of the SJT. In
Part III, I discuss a study conducted in 1992 by the Research and
Planning Office of the State Court Administrator through the Minnesota Supreme Court, research on the use of SJTs in Ramsey
County in 1996, and several cases that settled in whole or in part after SJTs over which I presided. These studies and evidence support
the premise that SJTs are an effective use of judicial time. In Part
IV, this article addresses some of the concerns raised about SJTs by
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. In conclusion, this article will
show that SJTs waste neither judges', neutrals', nor litigants' time,
but instead effectively reduce the number of cases that must be
tried and provide a satisfactory experience for litigants seeking justice through the court system.

the SJT concept at this time to aid trial counsel in predicting the probable outcome at a full trial which, in turn, aids settlement. See id.
6. Hon. S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 829, 829
(1986).
7. Richard Posner, The Summay Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternate Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHIC. L. REv. 366, 393 (1986).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Alternative DisputeResolution
S

8

Some of the more conventional types of ADR are arbitration,
mediation,9 neutral fact-finding,' ° mini-trial," consensual special
magistrate,
early neutral
evaluation
("ENE") ,i
media8. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(1) (1998). The Minnesota
Rules define arbitration as a "forum in which each party and its counsel present its
position before a neutral third party, who renders a specific award." Id. The arbitrator conducts the hearing and considers evidence. SeeJack M. Sabatino, ADR as
"LitigationLite": Proceduraland Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1296 (1998). Arbitration may or may not be binding, depending on such factors as whether the litigants agree to make it binding,
or a contractual agreement requires binding arbitration to settle disputes. See
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(1) (1998); Sabatino, supra, at 1296. "If

the parties do not stipulate that the award is binding, the award is not binding and
a request for trial de novo may be made." MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. DIST. CT.
114.02(a) (1) (1998).
9. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(7) (1998); Sabatino, supra
note 8, at 1297. In mediation, a "neutral person meets with disputants and attempts to assist them in reaching an agreement that either resolves their differences or satisfactorily accommodates their respective interests in spite of those differences." Sabatino, supra note 8, at 1297. The mediator can not impose his or
her own judgment on the parties. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. DIST. CT. 114.02(a) (7)
(1998).
10. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a) (6) (1998) ("A forum in which
a dispute, frequently one involving complex or technical issues, is investigated and
analyzed by an agreed-upon neutral who issues findings and a non-binding report
or recommendation.")
11. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a) (8) (1998). Rule 114.02(a) (8)
provides:
A forum in which each party and their counsel present their opinion, either before a selected representative for each party, before a neutral
third party, or both to define the issues and develop a basis for realistic
settlement negotiations. A neutral third party may issue an advisory opinion regarding the merits of the case. The advisory opinion is not binding
unless the parties agree that it is binding and enter into a written settlement agreement.
Id.
12. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. DIST. CT. 114.02(a) (2) (1998) ("A forum in which
a dispute is presented to a neutral third party in the same manner as a civil lawsuit
is presented to ajudge. This process is binding and includes the ight of appeal.")
13. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(5) (1998); Sabatino, supra
note 8, at 1298. In ENE, a neutral party "meets with litigants and their counsel
shortly after a case has been brought[,] .. . considers a summary of the major issues of liability and damages from all parties, and then gives them an advisory assessment of what he or she thinks of their positions." Sabatino, supra note 8, at
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tion/arbitration,14 'rent-a-judge, " 15 and the lesser known summary
jury trials (SJTs). 6 Some forms of ADR are more commonly known
than others. For example, mediation and arbitration are better
known to the average judge or attorney than neutral fact finding or
early neutral evaluation. In addition, some forms of ADR overlap.
For example, arbitration and mini-trial are very similar. In arbitration, the. arbitrator
..
.. is usually
. 17one person who makes either a nonbinding or binding decision. A mini-trial also usually has a oneperson fact finder, and that person makes either a non-binding or
binding decision.' 8 The main difference between arbitration and
mini-trial is that a mini-trial is more formal and has more of the indicia of a regular trial,' 9 whereas an arbitration is more similar to a
201
hearing.
Likewise, mediation and early independent neutral evaluations
have some similarities. The parties in mediation look to a mediator
to lead them to a settlement with which they all can live. " In an
ENE, the parties seek out a neutral evaluator to help them come to
1298; see also MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(5) (1998) ("A forum in
which attorneys present the core of the dispute to a neutral evaluator in the presence of the parties. This occurs after the case is filed but before discovery is conducted. The neutral then gives a candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case. If settlement does not result, the neutral helps narrow the
dispute and suggests guidelines for managing discovery.")
14. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a)(9) (1998) ("A hybrid of mediation and arbitration in which the parties initially mediate their disputes; but if
they reach impasse, they arbitrate the deadlocked issues."); see also Sabatino, supra
note 8, at 1299 (defining "med-arb" as where "a neutral starts the process as a mediator but then converts into an arbitrator if he or she cannot mediate a solution").
15. See Charles F. Webber, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial. Playing ly the Rules?,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1495, 1499 (1989); see generally The CaliforniaRent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1592, 1592-93 (1981) (discussing the use of retired state court judges to act as
referees hired by the litigants to render decisions with the finality of court judgments).
16. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 114.02(a) (4) (1998) ("A forum in which
each party and their counsel present a summary of their position before a panel of
jurors. The number of jurors on the panel is six unless the parties agree otherwise. The panel may issue a non-binding advisory opinion regarding liability,
damages, or both."); see also Sabatino, supra note 8, at 1298-99 (describing SJTs as
"shortened 'dry run' versions of trials, which are conducted before a jury empanelled under normal court procedures").
17. See Sabatino, supra note 8, at 1296-97; Webber, supra note 15, at 1499.
18. See Webber, supra note 15, at 1499.
19. See id.
20. See supranote 8.
See supranote 9 (discussing mediation).
21.
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a reasonable settlement in the hope that the case can be settled in
the early stages, with the idea that by saving the costs of litigation a
just settlement might be found.2 While all of these ADR methods
provide a way for litigants to resolve their differences outside of the
courtroom, they are not 2always a satisfactory solution to those who
want their "day in court."

3

Summary jury trials, however, involve a very different approach
to ADR. A SJT is1JT
usually an abbreviated half-day trial where each
24
side calls only one live witness. The judge picks the jury in about
fifteen minutes. Any expert witness testimony consists only of written reports. Excerpts from witnesses' depositions may be used. Oftentimes, opening statements and final arguments are merged; particularly when one side does not call any witnesses. An example of
this might be where the defendant admits liability in a personal injury case and is only contesting the amount of the plaintiff's damages. In an SJT, the defense might choose to spend its whole time
22. See supra note 13.
23. As Judge Spiegel so aptly stated: "[n]one of these methods provides the
parties with their day in court where they can air their grievances. In the eyes of
some, these techniques run counter to the American justice system's concept of
ventilation, confrontation, and vindication of rights in a structured adversarial system." Spiegel, supra note 6, at 833. Others have also commented about the importance of litigants, especially plaintiffs, needing to tell their story to a judge or
jury. See, e.g., Alexander B. Denson, The Summary Jury Trial: A Proposalfrom the
Bench, 1995J. DIsP. RESOL. 303, 303 (1995).
24. The following is a summary of the procedures I observe for SJTs held in
my court room. For additional information about procedures used in summary
jury trials, see Ann E. Woodley, Saving the Summary Jury Trial: A Proposal to Halt the
Flow of Litigation and End the Uncertainties,1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 213, 221-23 (1995).
See also Newman, supra note 1, at 183-86; Harges, supra note 1, at 802-05; Webber,
supra note 15, at 1496-97; Marla Moore, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Too Hasty a
Solution to the Growing Problem ofJudicial Inefficiency, 14 REv. LMG. 495, 496 (1995).
A key difference between my SJT procedures and those described by most commentators is that I allow limited live witness testimony.
In addition, after conducting approximately fifty SJTs, I have made the
following observations. The presiding judicial officer ought to apply the rules of
evidence the same as one would in a full-blown trial, with the exception that a
hearsay affidavit may be admitted if the party vouches that the witness will be
called at the trial. In addition, depositions ought to be admitted, particularly
where the opposing party had the opportunity to cross examine the witness at the
deposition. In Ramsey County, I follow the rules of evidence with the abovementioned caveat and so do the other presiding judicial officers over summary
jury trials. The purpose of a summary jury trial is to allow the parties to present a
capsule (or condensed) version of the trial and get the input from six summary
jurors as to how they would rule if this were a full-blown trial. Therefore, it would
not be logical to have different evidentiary rulings at the summary jury trial, as
compared to the full-blown trial.
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in arguments and submit only medical reports rather than use live
witnesses.
The court instructs the jury at the end of the SJT, usually with
abbreviated instructions. The verdict form is usually the same as in
a full trial, but may be shortened. The court limits jury deliberations to about three hours. 5 The parties and the attorneys must be
in court when the verdict is read. After hearing the verdict, the
court asks the jury a set of questions, such as: (1) What did you
think of the plaintiffs claim?; (2) How did you like the plaintiff as a
witness?; and (3) Was the plaintiff credible? Following this, the attorneys, and sometimes even the parties, may ask questions. This is
the most important part of the proceeding.
B.

Why Study SJTs?

Recently, the court system has looked to mandatory, nonbinding ADR in hopes that the civil cases can move more rapidly
and more cases can be settled rather than tried. 26 In order to have
the most efficient judicial system possible, we should not make a
determination as to which type of ADR process, if any, ought to be
used based on anecdotal evidence. Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in 1986:
The success or failure of the procedure must be verified
by accepted methods of (social) scientific hypothesis testing. I am unconvinced by anecdotes, glowing testimoni25.

A short deliberation is crucial, because jury deliberation is a transaction

cost. See RIcHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW

26.

§

21.13, at 583 (1992).

See Woodley, supra note 24, at 217. In Minnesota, the legislature has pro-

vided for an experiment in two judicial districts (Hennepin County and Ramsey
County) where judges can order nonbinding ADR.
(1998). This statute provides:

See MINN. STAT. § 484.74

In litigation involving an amount in excess of $7,500 in controversy, the
presiding judge may, by order, direct the parties to enter nonbinding al-

ternative dispute resolution. Alternatives may include private trials, neutral expert fact-finding, mediation, minitrials, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. The guidelines for the various alternatives must
be established by the presiding judge and must emphasize early and in-

expensive exchange of information and case evaluation in order to facilitate settlement.
Id. § 484.74, subd. 1. The statute also provides for binding ADR procedures using

special magistrates where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 and all parties
consent to ADR. See id. § 484.74, subd. 2a.
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als, confident assertions, appeals to intuition.2 7
The gist of Judge Posner's article was that we need a "dose of
social science" to determine whether summary juries are effective.
Judge Posner noted that each year there are approximately 14,000
civil trials in the federal courts, and suggested that for one or two
years, one percent of the cases ready for trial be assigned randomly
for summary jury trials.2 He indicated this should provide an adequate statistical sampling to evaluate this procedure. In particular, Judge Posner suggested selecting 1,000 federal cases at random,
dividing them randomly into two groups of 500 cases each, using a
SJT in each case in one group but in no case in the other group,
and then comparing the settlement rates.3' Such a comprehensive
study would permit a determination of whether SJTs played a significant role in the settlement of cases.
Judge Posner presented a legitimate concern about whether or
not SJTs waste judicial resources because they are too "lavish" with
the judges' time. Judge Posner conducted his own "admittedly
crude" studies to evaluate SJTs. 3 He found that there was no support for the conclusion that SJTs increased judicial efficiency. 3 In
addition, he believed that no credible techniques are being used
that would 35enable the outcome of the experiment to be evaluated
objectively.
27.

Posner, supra note 7, at 367.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 376.
See id. at 382.
See id. at 377. Judge Posner evaluated SJTs in the Northern District of

Ohio using published statistics to compare "various indicia of judicial perform-

ance" in that district with the other Ohio district and the other districts of the
Sixth Circuit. Id. Judge Posner compared data from before and after Judge Lambros introduced SJTs in his district to attempt to evaluate how the SJT affected the
number of trials, the median disposition time for trials, the number of cases terminated, and the number of cases pending. See id. at 378-79. Judge Posner could
not find any trend the suggested SJTs decreased the number of trials or pending
cases, or increased case terminations. See id. However, he repeatedly emphasized

the "crudeness" of the study. See id. at 382.
34. See Posner, supra note 7, at 382. He stated instead that "[t]he judicial
time taken up in summary jury trials might be spent equally well or even better on
some other method of encouraging settlements, especially when one considers
how lavish the summary jury trial is with the judge's time: he spends a whole day

trying to settle one case." Id.
35. See id.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/7
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A small dose of social science was also recommended by Federal District Judge William 0. Bertelsman, from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. In McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 36 Judge Bertelsman observed:
It is certainly true, as Judge Posner points out in his insightful article, that the effectiveness of summary jury trials has not been scientifically verified. I for one would
welcome a controlled experiment along the lines he suggests to see if it can be verified and in what type of cases
summary jury trials are most useful. Also, it would be
profitable to try to discern the most effective techniques
for employing them. It is interesting to note, however,
that a controlled scientific experiment such as that suggested by Judge Posner cannot be effectively conducted
unless summary jury trials are mandatory.37
Judge Bertelsman suggested even "unscientific" data may be
useful to evaluate SJTs. 3s And he added that in his own experience
SJTs had saved him sixty trial days because, in his limited use of the
procedure (five times), two cases set for thirty day trials had settled. 9
No doubt there exists a need to have some definitive evidence
of whether or not SJTs are worth the time, effort, and expense involved. There are few studies, to date, of which this author is aware
that evaluate SJTs. The father of the SJT, Federal Judge Thomas
Lambros, claimed a ninety percent settlement rate using SJTs in

36.

120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).

37. Id. at 49. But see In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir 1993) (disagreeing with Judge Bertelsman's finding in McKay that "mandatory summary jury trials
would seem to be within the inherent power of the court" and holding that "it is
error" to compel "an unwilling litigant to undergo this process [because it] improperly interposes the tribunal into the normal adversarial course of litigation").
38. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
39. See id. He further noted:
It is true that I cannot prove scientifically that the cases would not have
settled anyway but my experience tells me they would not. I do know that
but for my making summary jury trials mandatory in these cases, they
would not have occurred. I know also that the attorney who objected to
the first summary jury trial he was required to participate in is now the
biggest local fan of the procedure.
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the Northern District of Ohio, where he sits.4° The trouble with
this figure is that most studies show that, in fact, over ninety percent of all cases settle before trial. 4' Thus, in some sense, Judge
Lambros' statement, which extols SJTs, almost waves a red flag in
the face of the opponents of SJTs.
A better data set on SJTs was created by SeniorJudge S. Arthur
Spiegel, from the Southern District of Ohio. He recently summarized his experiences with SJTs in a case opinion holding that a
court can mandate the parties to SJT. He noted that over a thirteen year period, he had scheduled 131 SJTs.43 Of those, 106 settled before the SJT and sixteen settled after the SJT, resulting in a
ninety-three percent settlement rate before actual trial. 4 Of the
remaining cases, six settled during the actual trial, and three were
tried to completion.45 Of particular interest in Judge Spiegel's
summary of his experiences is that at least two of the three cases
as in the SJT.
that were tried to completion had the same verdict
Judge Spiegel also attempted to summarize the efficiency of
the SJTs in terms of time and cost. He stated that the sixteen SJTs
took a total of forty-nine days to try (about 1 months); the parties
estimated later that if those sixteen cases had been tried on the
merits they would have taken a total of 450 days (or about 1IA years,
47
about nine times longer in the court system). Judge Spiegel was
then able to provide estimates on the costs of this difference. He
indicated that in 1995, 224 trial days cost the court system
$211,449.62, resulting in an average cost per jury trial day of
$943.97.48 Thus, by saving the trial court over 400 jury trial days,
even just sixteen SJT-prompted settlements provided "significant"
savings injury costs alone. 49 Judge Spiegel concluded that "in addi-

40. See Thomas Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:A New Adversarial
Model fora New Era, 50 U. PTr. L. REv. 789, 800 (1989).
See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Dis41.
covey Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1989) (finding that 95% of all civil
cases filed in federal courts are terminated before trial).
See In re Southern Correctional Facility, 166 F.R.D. 391, 394 (S.D. Ohio
42.
1996).
43.
See id.
44.
See id.
See id.
45.
46. See id. Judge Spiegel apparently tried only two of the three cases, and did
not state the result of the third case, if known. See id.
47. See id.
See id. at 394 n.2.
48.
See id.
49.
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tion to the savings recognized by the individual litigants, the use of
the summary jury trial has
significantly reduced administrative, jury
50
and other related costs."

The few other available studies also suggest success and satisfaction with SJTs. For example, during a six year period the Western District of Oklahoma held 187 SJTs, of which seventy settled
prior to the SJT and seventy-nine settled after the SJT (about an
eighty percent settlement rate before actual trial).
In addition,
another study found that sixty-four percent of state lawyers and
fifty-three percent of federal5 2lawyers believed that SJT verdicts were
reflective of true trial results.

Although these few studies provide some idea as to the effectiveness of SJTs, more information is needed to evaluate their usefulness in the court system. For this reason, I embarked on a study
back in 1992 that has provided some additional information about
litigant and attorney opinions of the effectiveness of SJTs, as well as
data showing settlement percentages.
III. Do SJTS INCREASEJUDICIAL EFFICIENCY? TWO STUDIES AND
THEIR RESULTS, AND RELATED CASE EXAMPLES

In the summer of 1992, the Honorable Kenneth Fitzpatrick,
ChiefJudge of the Ramsey County District Court, named me Chair
of the Ramsey County Court Calendar Committee. That same
summer, I took a class in Law and Social Science from Professor
50. Id. at 394. Judge Spiegel previously estimated the effectiveness of SJTs in
1985, and shared the results in a speech to the Federal Bar Association. See
Spiegel, supra note 6, at 829. At that time Judge Spiegel was able to summarize the
results from eight SJTs. See id. at 834. He indicated that a total of seventeen days,
which included the jury deliberation time, were necessary to conduct the eight
SJTs. See id. By comparison, it had been estimated through pretrial conferences
that the eight cases would take 135 days to dispose of through regular trials. See id.
Three of the eight cases settled following the SJT, and two during the first week of
the trial on the merits after a total of nine days of trial. See id. One case was tried
to completion over a seven day period with a verdict identical to that given by the
SJT jury. See id. This resulted in a total of 33 court days between the SJTs and
cases proceeding to trial; so even with two trials on the merits remaining, the total
trial time was likely to be substantially less than the predicted 135 trial days. See id.
51. See DONOVAN LEIsuRE NEWTON & IRVINE, ADR PRAcTIcE BOOK 40 (John H.
Wilkinson, ed., Cum. Supp. 1992), as cited in In re Southern Correctional Facility,
166 F.R.D. 391, 394 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
52. See James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of ParticipatingLawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 213, 228 (1989), as cited in In re Southern Correctional Facility, 166 F.R.D.
391, 394 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
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James Richardson at the University of Nevada-Reno in pursuit of a
degree in Masters of Judicial Studies. After taking this course, I
suggested to Chief Judge Fitzpatrick that Ramsey County commission a study to compare different methods of ADR, focusing in particular on SJTs.
The idea of conducting a study arose from Judge Posner's
1986 article.5 ' Agreeing wholeheartedly with the need for data on
the use of ADR methods and SJTs in particular, we conducted a
study in 1993 in Ramsey County and another analysis in 1996. The
1993 study assigned cases to various ADR procedures, evaluated the
trial rate of those cases following ADR, and then queried the attorney participants afterwards as to their views of those procedures.
By comparison, the 1996 study simply evaluated whether and when
cases assigned to the various ADR proceedings settled before, during, or after the proceeding, if at all. These two studies are summarized below. In addition, I have had the opportunity to preside
over a number of SJTs; I summarize five of these cases and their results below to show the beneficial effects of SJTs on litigants and
encouraging settlements.
A.

Ramsey County StatisticalStudy

Based on the social science course from Professor Richardson,
as well as the suggestions for studies by Judges Posner and
Bertelsman, 54 a study was developed in 1992 in Ramsey County. 55
Civil cases filed in 1993 were randomly assigned to either a control
group, an experiment group of cases eligible for mediation/arbitration, or a second experiment group of cases eligible for
56
summary jury trial.
Selections were made from the major civil
cases that were filed and placed on a "standard" case track. Case
53.
54.
55.

Court.

See supranotes 27-35 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 27-39 and accompanying text.
The study is summarized in detail in a report to the Minnesota Supreme

See

RESEARCH

AND

PLANNING

OFFICE

STATE

COURT

ADMINISTRATION,

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, REPORT ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN RAMSEY COUNTY (1995) [hereinafter RAMSEY COUNTY REPORT]. I was

assisted in this study by ChiefJudge Kenneth Fitzpatrick; Lynae Olson, the Ramsey
County District Court Civil Coordinator; and the Research and Planning Office of
the State Court Administration, Minnesota Supreme Court. Permission to incorporate the Ramsey County Report into this article was granted by the Office of Research and Planning.
56. See RAMSEY COUNTY REPORT, supra note 55, at 1
57. See id. at 2 & n.2. Ramsey County uses a "differentiated case management
system" where cases are placed on either an expedited case track (expected to set-
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assignment continued until roughly 100 cases were assigned to
each group-control, mediation/arbitration, or summary jury
trial. Cases were not allowed out of the control group to which
they were assigned.
Data on case processing were obtained from the State Judicial
Information System for each of the cases in the three groups. 59 In
addition, questionnaires were sent by mail to those litigants and
their attorneys who were involved in the SJTs. 60 The questionnaires
were mailed in October of 1994 to attorneys, and to the litigants in
December of 1994.
To evaluate varying ADR processes, the Ramsey County SJT assessment was compared to a study conducted in Hennepin County
several years earlier on the use of mediation. 61
1.

Summary of NumericalResults

The results of the 1993 Ramsey County survey are summarized
in Table 1. These numbers indicate that the trial rate for the control group cases, those not eligible for any form of ADR, was 6.4%
higher than the SJT experimental group. Regarding the SJT cases,
only 3.6% went to full trial. The survey also indicated that the trial
rate for the control group was 5.9% higher than the mediation/arbitration group.
Regarding the mediation/arbitration
group, 4.1% went to trial. Interestingly, however, the control
62
group cases were disposed of in the same or less number of days.

tie quickly), standard case track, or complex case track (assigned immediately to
an individual judge). Id. Cases on the "expedited" or "complex" case tracks were
not included in this study. See id.
58. See id. at 2.
59. See id. at 3.
60. See id. at 3. Attorney names were available in the Ramsey County court
records, but litigant names were not available. See id. Attorneys were asked to provide the names and addresses of their clients, but few complied with this request
so the number of litigant responses was quite low (only 17 litigant responses compared to 55 attorney responses). See id.
61. See RAMSEY CouNrY REPORT, supra note 55, at 1. The Hennepin County
study was also summarized in a report. See id. (referring to STATE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY:
EVALUATION (Feb. 1991)).

AN

62. The Ramsey County Report notes that five cases in the control group
were awaiting trial and would possibly increase the trial rate and time to disposition statistics. See RAMSEY CouNTY REPORT, supranote 55, at 4.
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Table 1. Processingof Ramsey County ADR Evaluation Cases6 3

Group

No. of
Cases

Days to
Percent of Disp osition
Cases
MeDisposed Mean dian
as of

Trial
Rate

12/94

1. Control
2. Summarylury Trial
3. Mediation/Arbitration
a. ADR
b. No ADR

80
83
97
35
62

94%
95%
98%
100%
97%

211
221
213
311
156

216
252
219
301
160

10.0%
3.6%
4.1%
8.6%
1.6%

In Hennepin County, the median time to disposition for the
control group was 252 days, while the time to disposition for the
experimental group (ADR cases) was 232 days. 64 Interestingly, trial
rates for the experimental group were actually higher in Hennepin
County than for the control group, a result which was not found in
the Ramsey County data."
One measure of success for an ADR program is how well it
conserves judicial resources for use in cases that truly require judicial intervention. The Hennepin County study found that the use
of mediation saved some judge time.66 In Ramsey County, as shown
in Table 2, the control group required an average of approximately
one hearing per case (0.99). However, only about half (52.5%) of
these cases were disposed with some court activity. For the SJT
group, the numbers are very similar. Thus, the SJT program did
not significantly reduce the frequency of judicial intervention in
cases. For the mediation/arbitration group, however, fewer hearings per case were held (.54) and fewer cases required court activity
for disposition (36.5%).

63.

See id.

64.
65.
66.

See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
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Table 2. Court Appearancesfor Each Sample Group6 7
Group

Average Number of Hearings
per Case'

Percent of Cases
Disposed With
Some Court Activ69

1. Control
2. Summary.jury Trial
3. Mediation/Arbitration
a. ADR
b. No ADR

2.

.99
.94
.54
.82
.39

52.5%
52.0%
36.5%
47.0%
31.0%

Summary of Effects on Attorneys and Litigants

Both the Ramsey County and Hennepin County studies queried attorneys and litigants as to their opinions about various aspects of either mediation (Hennepin County only) or SJT (Ramsey
County only). The data from these two studies is summarized below in Figures 1 through 8, with the percentage of responses listed
for attorneys and litigants, for either mediation or SJT.
As shown in Figure 1, slightly more attorneys (96%) and litigants (84%) participating in mediation felt they had an adequate
opportunity to present their case than those attorneys (79%) and
litigants (75%) participating in SJTs. Even so, over three-fourths of
the attorneys and litigants found both ADR processes sufficient to
allow them to present their case.

67. See id. at 5.
68. Calculated by dividing the total number of hearings held in the group, by
the total number of cases in the group.
69. Calculated by dividing the number of cases which had some sort of court
activity before a judge (e.g. a hearing, a pre-trial conference, etc.), by the total
number of cases in the group.
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Figure 1. Were you given an adequate opportunity to present your
case?
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Attorney

Litigant

* Mediation (J SJT

Attorneys were slightly more likely than litigants to believe the
other side or jury heard their case in both mediation (75% of attorneys compared to 63% of litigants) and SJT (76% of attorneys
compared to 58% of litigants) processes, as shown in Figure 2.
Even so, as shown in Figure 3, approximately three-fourths of attorneys and litigants from both the mediation and SJT groups felt
their cases were handled "very fairly" or "fairly."
Figure 2. Do you believe the other side/jury heardyour case?

100%
80%

75% 76%

60%
40%-

20%0%
Attorney

Litigant

* Mediation 13 SJT
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Figure 3. What is your opinion of the ability of this process to handle
your casefairly?

100%
•
=

80%
60%

74% 76%

75% 76%

-

40%
. 20%
S

0%
Attorney

Litigant

N Mediation l SJT

Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4, 81% attorneys found the
SJT process to be either "very efficient" or "efficient" as compared
to only 56% of those participating in mediation. Litigants viewed
the two processes similarly. The Ramsey County Report hypothesized that "[b] ecause of the timing of summary jury trials, attorneys
may be comparing them to full jury trials, however., 7' Along these
same lines, 68% of attorneys were either "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with the SJT process, while only 42% felt the same way about
mediation, as shown in Figure 5. Again, litigants rated the two processes similarly. The Ramsey County Report suggested that the
disparity in attorney responses could be a result of attitude changes
toward ADR processes in general over time; by comparison, it
would make sense that litigants, who are not regularly exposed to
various trial and ADR methods, would view the two ADR methods
similarly even during the different time periods involved in the
Hennepin and Ramsey County studies (late 1980s versus early
1990s, respectively) .71

70.
71.

RAMSEY COUNTY REPORT, supranote 55, at 8.
See RAMSEY COUNTY REPORT, supra note 55, at 9.
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What is your opinion of the ability of the process to handle
your case efficiently?
100%
81%

*-80%-

64% 67°3

S60%40%
k

20%

%

0%

Attorney

Litigant

U Mediation U SJT ]

Figure5. In general, how satisfied areyou with the process?

100%

. 80%
5AN_

:a60%'

40%20%

-

S0%Attorney

Litigant

U Mediation U SJT
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Litigants were also asked whether they felt they saved money
through mediation or SJT over a regular trial process and the results are shown in Figure 6. While 43% of the litigants felt they
saved money through mediation, only 25% felt SJT saved them
money.12 By comparison, 17% of litigants felt they spent more
money in both mediation and SJT.
Figure 6.

Will you (or your firm) have saved money or spent additional money on this caseparticipatingin the process?

100%
80%
4

60%

17% 17%

40%
20%
Saved Money

Spent More
Money

U Mediation El SJT

The studies also asked attorneys to report whether they felt
they spent more or less time on the ADR procedure than they
would have for a regular trial process. As shown in Figure 7, while
about one-third of attorneys felt that they spent less time in the
ADR process (either mediation or SJT), 30% felt they spent more
time because of mediation, and 57% felt that SJT required them to
spend more time on the case. Interestingly enough, as shown in
Figure 8, when litigants were asked whether they thought billable
hours increased or decreased as a result of the ADR process, they
generally (56% in mediation and 58% in SJT) replied that billable
hours decreased. Only a small percentage (16% in mediation and
17% in SJT) thought the hours billed increased. Attorney responses for SJT (no data available for mediation) reflected an op72. The Ramsey County Report suggested this difference might be explained
by "the relatively late invocation of the summary jury trial process." Id. at 9.
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posing view, with 49% believing the ADR process increased the
time billed and 31% believing it decreased the time billed.
Figure 7.

Has this process had any effect on the amount of time you
(attorneys) spent on this case?

100%
U

80%
57%

60%
.

40%

II% 32%

SE 20%
S0%
Less Time

More Time

[] Mediation El SJT

Figure 8.

Generally, do you (litigants) think this process reduced or
increased time billed to clients compared to the normal adjudicativeprocess?

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

16% 17%

0IIL1
Increase Time

Decrease Time

UE Mediation []SJT
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The Ramsey County study concluded by stating:
This study should provide some guidelines to judges and
administrators as they make decisions about what type of
ADR technique to invoke for a particular case. If the interest is in settling more quickly, then mediation/arbitration should be used. If a case has advanced
without settling and looks like it might need to be tried, a
summary jury trial might be useful in encouraging settlement. Using either method can reduce the number of
trials and conserve precious judicial resources to apply to
cases which require them.73
B. Recent Evidence After the Ramsey County Report
As a follow up to the Ramsey County Report, from January
1996 to December 1996, the Ramsey County District Courts tracked
cases where the litigants opted for various forms of ADR, including
SJTs, rather than proceeding to a full court trial. Table 3 below
summarizes the results of this study.
As noted in Table 3, a total of 1,074 cases opted to try ADR in
1996. Of these, 671 were still pending or removed from the court
calendar by the end of the year due to settlements. The other 403
were dismissed or withdrawn, or found not to be suitable for ADR,
such as medical malpractice cases, appeals of city official assessments, and smaller civil cases. As shown in Table 3, of the 671 cases
that were pending or removed by the end of the year, 530 opted for
mediation, 112 for arbitration, 1 for mediation-arbitration, 2 for
moderated-settlement conference, 2 for early neutral evaluation,
and 24 for SJT.
Of the 24 cases opting for non-binding SJTs, all 24 cases settled. A third of these cases did not settle until after the SJT. Of the
530 cases opting for mediation, 521 cases settled, although only 93
actually proceeded with mediation because the rest had settled
prior to that step. Of the 112 cases choosing non-binding arbitration, 109 settled before trial, with 38 still pending at the time of the
arbitration. The results show that, when used, SJTs serve as an effective settlement tool available along with the more traditional
methods of mediation and arbitration.
73.

RAMSEY COUNTY REPORT, supra note 55, at 11-12.
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Table 3. 1996 Ramsey County Case Disposition
ARB

_ED

Cases Initially to

MAR MSC

ENE

SIT

TOTAL

830

202

4

6

5

27

1074

300

90

3

4

3

3

403

530

112

1

2

2

24

671

217
211

55
16

0
0

1
0

1
1

16
0

290
228

71

0

1

2

16

518

-

-

-

67%

77%

1

1

0

8

ADR

Cases Dismissed,
Withdrawn, or
Found to Not Be
Suitable for ADR

Cases Pending and
Suitable for ADR
Processes

Cases Settled Before
ADR
Cases Settled at ADR
(usually during the
process)

Total Cases Settled

428

at or Prior to ADR

Percent of Cases Setled at or Prior to

_

81%

63%

93

38

ADR

Cases Settled After
ADR and Before
Trial

Remaining Cases

141
I

_

9

3

0

0

0

0

12

521

109

1

2

2

24

659

100%

98%

(not settled)

Total Case Settlements

Percent of Total Settlements, Before, At,

98% 97%

-

-

-

or After ADR

Key:
MED = Mediation
ARB = Arbitration
MAR = Mediation-Arbitration (started with mediation and
ended in arbitration)
MSC = Moderated Settlement Conference
ENE = Early Neutral Evaluation
SJT = SummaryJury Trial
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C. CaseExamples
Existing settlement theory predicts that both parties will calculate an expected value based upon their estimates of winning, factoring in the cost of litigation. Summary jury trials save transaction costs-attorney's fees, expert witness's fees, and other client
costs. They also save costs to the courts in judicial time, jury fees,
and support staff time (also a form of transaction costs).
I will take my experiences in five different cases prior to 1996,
four of which opted for nonbinding SJT and one which involved a
binding SJT, and show how they were more economically efficient
75
than a full-blown trial with higher transaction costs.
1.

The Offer Was Kept Open

The first case I would like to discuss is the case I call "The Offer Was Kept Open." This case was the first SJT heard in Ramsey
County, and the first over which I presided. I suggested this form
of dispute resolution to the attorneys after attending a course on
ADR offered by the National Judicial College in Boston in October
1990. The SJT was held in November 1990 after a pre-trial conference where the attorneys agreed to participate in an SJT
The plaintiff in this case was rear-ended in a car accident and
sued the defendant for a soft tissue injury to her back. The defendant admitted liability, but denied that the plaintiff had any permanent injuries. The defendant's insurance company offered
$7,500 to settle, but the plaintiff demanded $15,000. Counsel for
both sides urged the court to add a non-traditional step to the SJT
process and allow at least one live witness for each side to be questioned at the SJT. Both sides wanted the plaintiff to testify so she
would receive a better evaluation of her case and input from the
summary jurors through their verdict and subsequent questioning
by the court and counsel. It is my opinion that the live testimony
assisted in the settlement of the case.
Interestingly, although the defendant had admitted liability,
the summary jury awarded the plaintiff nothing, finding no perma74.

See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economic Analysis of Legal

Disputes and TheirResolution, 27J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067 (1989).

75. Editor's Note: These anecdotal observations are based on the author's
recollections and portions of tape recorded transcripts. Readers desiring additional public information about these cases are encouraged to contact the author
directly.
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nent injury. The fact that the plaintiff had the opportunity to tell
the jury about her symptoms, but still received no damages, helped
convince her that she ought to reconsider the defendant insurance
company's settlement offer. After the plaintiff heard what the
summary jurors said about her case, she accepted the $7,500 that
the defendant's insurance company still kept on the table. This was
an economic and efficient result. The plaintiff heard from six
people what her real-life probability of winning in a real trial would
be. As a result she had the opportunity to reevaluate her position.
Although she "lost," she received a "Mulligan" and was able to settle
for $7,500.76 Both parties saved transaction costs regarding the testimony of their respective doctors who probably would have
charged each party $3,000.
2.

The QuestionableInsuranceAgent

In this SJT, a sub-agent claimed that he was owed a commission of $5,000 by his employer, an insurance agent. The defendant
claimed he did not owe the plaintiff anything because the plaintiff
was on a training program and not entitled to any commissions.
Also, he claimed that the plaintiff was either incompetent or a
crook, alleging that the plaintiff nearly got himself arrested by
fraudulently attempting to sell an 89 year-old widow a disability policy. Before the SJT, the defendant offered the plaintiff $1,500 to
settle the case.
The summary jury heard the case and found for the defendant. Afterwards, the court and parties discussed the decision with
the six jurors. Here, in a nutshell, are some of thoughts of the
summary jury.
JUDGE: Why didn't you feel the contract was breached?
JUROR 5: It appears to me that [the defendant] had
brought him [the plaintiff] on board as sort of a training
period and he was still under that training period; therefore, that was one of the arguments that I gave consideration in determining whether or not there was an actual
76. Here, plaintiff became more pessimistic about winning. P - S is negative.
See Posner, supra note 25, § 21.5, at 556. Posner notes "litigation will occur only if
both parties are optimistic about the outcome of the litigation." Id. Thus, a case,
"afortiori... will be settled if one party is more pessimistic than the other...." Id
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breach of contract. Some of the other arguments have already been presented by these two (indicating).
JUDGE: Was there anybody that felt that the plaintiff
should get any money at anytime?
JUROR: Well, early on, I think we were discussing $300
that was not paid there, alleged to be not paid out of the
$1,500 that was thrown around a bit. It kind of was waived
off ....
JUDGE: Let me just throw this out to you. There have
been some settlement discussions, and if the plaintiff
could get $1,500, would you recommend that he take it
before the trial that's due to come up in a couple weeks?
JUROR: I'd certainly think he definitely should take it.
JUROR 2: We had sympathy for the plaintiff. It wasn't
enough to persuade us.
JUROR 3: We didn't like to see him end up short, but we
got to do yea or nay on this.
JUROR 3: Certainly didn't figure $10,000 was anywhere
near worth this. Too many of them weren't even-too
many were no commissions taken ....
JUROR 4: To me, there's a sort of vindictive nature to this
court trial. Somebody feeling that they were wronged and
seeking revenge. To me, there is no compensation for
that[;] zero dollars amount for that, no $1,500.
JUDGE: Beg your pardon?
JUROR 4: I said zero dollar amount, no $1,500, is how I
feel. That's my opinion.
JUDGE: But on the other hand, if the plaintiff could receive that in a settlement, would you recommend that he
take it?
VARIOUS JURORS: Definitely. Certainly. I certainly think
he should go for it.
Ten minutes after this discussion, the plaintiff settled for
$1,500 after some discussions in chambers. The case would have
taken much longer to resolve but for the summary jurors, and in
particular Juror 4, who said not to give the plaintiff anything. This
juror's frankness when he talked about the vindictive nature of the
lawsuit opened the door to the settlement room. The other five ju-
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rors took the position that the plaintiff should not get anything, although they had toyed with the idea to maybe give him some
nominal amount. However, Juror 4 shook the plaintiff. The plaintiff probably felt he should take the offered settlement rather than
risk a Juror 4 on the real trial.
A trial on this case would have taken three days, especially if it
was as the one summary juror characterized it, "a vindictive lawsuit." Thus, this case had the potential for high transaction costs
for both parties and the court system.
3.

The Classic CarCase

The plaintiff owned a 1954 classic Chevy. The plaintiff
brought his car to the defendant, a classic car restorer and rebuilder, to have it restored. The defendant asked for $10,000 down
for parts, which the plaintiff paid to him. Several months later, the
defendant still had not completed repairs to the car and claimed
he needed more money for parts. The plaintiff refused, and instead sued the defendant for breach of contract, consumer fraud,
and replevin (i.e., return of the car). The defendant counter-sued
for breach of the contract.
The defendant was in poor financial straits at the time of the
SJT, claiming to be contemplating bankruptcy. The summary jury
awarded the plaintiff $18,000 for breach of contract, but found that
the defendant did not commit consumer fraud. This was important because the plaintiff could have been awarded attorney's fees
if he had prevailed on this issue and would have been entitled to
receive punitive damages.
The plaintiff hoped to capitalize on the fraud and punitive
damages in the main trial, but the court's discussion with the summary jurors after their decision diffused him:
COURT: Maybe I could ask this question. Was there anybody on the jury that felt there was fraud and misrepresentation?
JUROR: No.
COURT: Or anybody that felt that the plaintiff should get
punitive damages?
JUROR: No.
The jurors discussed damages further, with one juror summing
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up the punitive damages question, the lack of fraud, and the way
they arrived at damages:
COURT: Yeah, what were your thoughts on damages?
JUROR: Well, because of the way of wording as far as punitive damages, I can't say that there was intent to commit
a fraud. Itjust happened that there was problems with it.
I had gone through a similar thing when my house was hit
by a tornado with the builder. And the same thing happened so I understand how they feel, and all the anguish
and, if anything, I would lean towards giving them more
money, but I think the $17,500 is fair because I've been in
their shoes.
COURT: Did anyone want to give less than [$] 14[,000]
JUROR: That was about the point, was about $14,500.
JUROR 2: $14,500 to $17,500.
The plaintiff was particularly interested in punitive damages
because an award of punitive damages would not be dischargeable
in bankruptcy, and given the classic car repair man's statements it
seemed likely he would declare bankruptcy if the jury awarded the
plaintiff $17,500. The plaintiff's attorney explored the punitive
damages issue further, but did not receive much solace from the
summary jury:
[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, maybe if I can just ask a
couple questions, and I'll just throw them out and anyone
who feels like answering... regarding the punitive damages. Was it my understanding that based on testimony,
you heard today, you felt-I believe someone mentioned
it-you felt there was no willful intent to cause to my clients harm... -that you felt the defendant thought he
was within his rights to take the engine and the transmission out ... ?
JUROR: We think that he probably took it out-to himself, he was doing the right thing rather than doing something to harm somebody else. We felt that he had some
money into it and just felt that it was his. It meant as
much as to the other group-to the other party.
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Once the plaintiffs attorney was convinced that the entire
summary jury refused to award punitive damages, he moved on to
their reason for their verdict:
[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: And so [as to] the breach of
contract[,] you all believed that the written estimate constituted... ?
JUROR: Well, that's not the exact price, but we felt that it
should be within the first 10-15%. Even if he was an expert, we knew that certain things came up prior to, and all
prior experiences that we've all had is that if something
comes up, you get a phone call and the estimate is gone
through saying, which do you want me to do, the rebuilt
or go from there, but even so, it's within about 10-15%.
In additional discussions with the summary jurors after the
verdict, all jurors felt the defendant breached the contract by his
non-performance.
As the judge on this case, I pointed out to the jurors that the
problem with any settlement was that the defendant was broke and
contemplating bankruptcy. I asked the summary jurors if any one
of them had any solutions as to how the case could be settled. One
juror raised his hand and gave this solution: the plaintiff should
give "blank" number of dollars to his attorney, who would, in turn,
put the money in an escrow account. The attorney would pay the
defendant out of the escrow account once the defendant submitted
verified invoices for parts. When the job was done, the defendant
would get anything left over in the escrow account.
The parties settled on this basis. The plaintiff gave his attorney
$6,000 to place in his trust account. His attorney paid the defendant as the work was completed. This saved some very wasteful
transaction costs. If the defendant had been hit with an $18,000
judgment, he would have probably been forced into bankruptcy,
which would have been a high transaction cost. The plaintiff would
have had a piece of paper awarding him $18,000, suitable for framing, but ineffective to serve any other purpose given the defendant's bankruptcy. The plaintiff would not have any money, and
would not have his car back in any better shape-and probably
worse shape than when he took it to be repaired. The plaintiff
would have experienced high transaction costs such as attorney's
fees and witness's fees, with very little return. The summary juror's
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solution was by far the most economically efficient.
4.

The Reluctant Home Owner

This was a case where a couple hired a builder to construct a
home. The husband possessed an engineering degree and had
some sort of a background in construction. He decided to become
his own general contractor and subcontracted out a great deal of
work to build a new house. Although he chose a builder, the husband was really in charge of the building process. The builder,
who in a sense became the husband's subcontractor, failed to meet
the husband's expectations. As a result the couple sued the builder
and one of the builder's subcontractors.
The husband spent a great deal of time preparing for the lawsuit, lining up some expert witnesses and expending a fair sum on
attorney's fees. If the case had gone to trial, he would have spent
considerably more. The plaintiffs wanted about $120,000, but the
defendants were only willing to pay $105,000. The plaintiffs' attorney urged them to take the $105,000, pointing out that this was a
substantial sum, particularly in light of the fact that the total value
of the house was under $300,000. In addition, he noted that a trial
on this matter would probably last ten days, resulting in significant
litigation costs such as expert witnesses' fees. Finally, the attorney
added that unless there was a higher probability of winning more
than $105,000, the attorney's fees for a ten day trial would make
the process unfeasible for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiff-wife was amenable to settlement, but her husband
was not. He was frustrated because of what they had experienced
with the builder and subcontractor and because of all the preparation he had done for trial. In a sense, it is likely the case had become an obsession for him.
The summary jury returned a verdict of only $90,000 for the
plaintiffs. The post verdict discussions were different here. Besides
the questions by myself and the attorneys, I also allowed the plaintiff-husband to ask the jurors some questions. The answers the
summary jurors gave to the husband convinced him to agree to a
settlement of $100,000, the amount the defendants were offering
after the summary jury verdict. This was a case where the opinions
of the summary jurors had a stronger effect on the plaintiff husband than anything his attorney or the judge could have said.
This was one of the most economically efficient SJTs over
which I have presided. There would have been so many wasted
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transaction costs expended by both parties and the court for a case
with a fairly predictable result.
5.

The Incomplete Kitchen

The last case is one that, hopefully, is typical of a trend focusing on SJTs as a binding process. In this case, the plaintiffs were
hired by the defendants to remodel a kitchen in the defendant
couple's home. The plaintiffs claimed they completed the job and
the defendants owed them about $4,500 for the work. The defendants claimed the plaintiffs did such a poor job on the kitchen remodeling project that they would have to get someone else to finish
the job, and thus they did not owe the plaintiffs anything. The case
was heard on January 25, 1994 by a summary jury, which deliberated on January 26.
The parties had agreed to make the decision of the summary
jury binding. This was due in part to the fact that the case did not
involve a large amount of money, as the largest verdict would have
been about $5,000; the defendants had spent $2,000 on attorney's
fees before dismissing their attorney and representing themselves,
and they felt added attorney's fees for trial would be a waste of
money; and the plaintiffs' attorney felt he could adequately present
the plaintiffs' case in a summary fashion.
The summary jury decided that both parties breached the contract. However, it found that the plaintiffs' breach did not cause
the defendants any damages. Thus, the summary jury only awarded
the plaintiffs $2,000 for the defendants' breach. Even so, both parties received some satisfaction from the result. The defendants,
who received nothing, were saved additional attorney's fees by not
having an attorney present at the SJT. The plaintiffs were able to
present their case faster and at far less expense than at a full court
trial.
D. Summary/Analysis of Studies
These case examples, which are summarized in Table 4, show
several things. Litigants are more likely to listen to summary jurors
than their attorneys or even qualified neutrals as to the monetary
value of their cases, as observed in the "Questionable Insurance
Agent" and the "Reluctant Homeowner" cases. In addition, oftentimes six lay people can come up with a more workable solution
than a qualified mediator as found in the "Classic Car Case." The
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"Incomplete Kitchen Case" demonstrates that binding SJTs could
be the wave of the future. As litigation expenses continue to grow,
it is likely the courts will see more pro se litigants frustrated by the
high costs of hiring an attorney. In addition, more litigants will be
interested in finding ways to cut their litigation expenses. The SJT
provides the best of both worlds for these litigants-the transaction
costs of the SJT are much lower than at a full trial, and the litigants
have the opportunity to be heard by a panel of their "peers" and to
receive a binding verdict which will end the litigation.
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Table 4. Summary of ST Example Cases
Case
1. The Offer Was
Kept Open
Plaintiff's Demand:
$15,000
Defendant's Offer:
$7,500
2. The Questionable Insurance
Agent
Plaintiffs Demand:
$5,000
Defendant's Offer:

Case Type

SummaryJury
Decision

Settlement?

Personal injury;
Defendant admitted liability
but denied
damages

For Defendant
(no money for
Plaintiff)

Employment
contract; suit
for payment of
commissions

For Defendant
(no money for
Plaintiff)

Yes - Plaintiff took offer of $7,500
which was
still on the
table
Yes - Plaintiff took offer of $1,500
which was
still on the
table

Car repair work

For Plaintiff
for $18,000

Compromise
at jury
member's
suggestion.

Home construction

For Plaintiffs
for $90,000

Yes - Plaintiffs took
new offer of
$100,000

Kitchen remodeling

For Plaintiffs
for $2,000

N/A (binding SJf)

$1,500

3. The Classic Car
Case
Plaintiffs Demand:
n/a
Defendant's Offer:
n/a
4. The Reluctant
Home Owner
Plaintiffs' Demand:
$120,000
Defendants' Offer:
$105,000
5. The Incomplete
Kitchen
Plaintiffs' Demand:
$4,500
Defendants' Offer:
n/a
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IV. SOUR NOTES - ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF SJTS

There exist certain sour notes and negative impressions about
SJTs. Summaryjury trials initially sailed along smoothly from their
inception by Judge Lambros, until the University of Chicago Law Review article by Judge Posner in 1986.17 Sour notes and misconceptions continue through 1999 due to the concerns expressed by
Judge Posner and others. Some of the arguments made by Judge
Posner in 1986, that were more recently re-examined by author
Maria Moore,78 suggest SJTs are a waste of time and involve involuntary servitude on the part of the jurors, among other things. 79
These arguments tend to stem from a lack of empirical evidence
and a concern for the judicial authority to mandate parties into
ADR proceedings in general, leaving the question of the SJT process largely untouched in itself. This section will address these concerns.
A. STs Are a Waste of Time
Marla Moore argues that SJTs are ultimately a waste of time
and expense for all and have serious constitutional problems. 0 In
this author's opinion, Moore's arguments are just a re-hash of
Judge Posner's position taken back in 1986. Moore offers no empirical evidence whatsoever to support her conclusions.
Judge
Spiegel addressed this argument as well in a speech in
81
1985. He said counsel complained that SJTs caused "extra work
and expense for their clients. 82 Judge Spiegel's response was "if it
succeeds, it certainly cuts the time the lawyers would spend in court
trying the case on the merits and that alone should reduce the cli,,83
ents' expenses.
He added, that even where SJT fails to garner a
settlement, "the work of counsel and the Court hasn't been wasted

77. See Posner, supra note 7, at 369-73 (noting, among others, doubts about
the conscientousness of mock juries and possible cost increases to the system as
problems of SJTs).
78. See Moore, supranote 24, at 495.
79. However, it should be noted that many of the concerns raised by Moore,
as well as another critic, Charles F. Webber, see supra note 15, arise out of a concern for the use of mandatory SJTs.
80. See Moore supra note 24, at 497, 516-18.
81. See Spiegel, supra note 6, at 836-37.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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as trial on the merits will be scheduled shortly thereafter." 84
The biggest argument to counter Moore's position that summary juries are a waste of time and expense are the various bits of
empirical evidence reported in this article, including in particular
85
the surveys conducted by Ramsey County. Most studies show that,
in fact, over ninety percent of all cases settle before trial.86 By comparison, in the Ramsey County study only 4.1% of mediation/arbitration groups went to trial (95.9% settled), and 3.6% of
the SJT group went to trial (96.4% settled). These numbers suggest that it may be more than twice as likely there will be a trial for
those cases which were not referred to some type of ADR process,
such as SJT or mediation/arbitration.
In addition, although it is unclear how statistically significant
an increase in the settlement rate from 90% to 96% might be, the
possibility that six more cases out of 100 could settle due to SJTs
and other ADR processes would help to make the administration of
justice more efficient and decrease transaction costs even though
some judicial intervention was required. For example, while the
average SJT lasts about one-half day, the average standard jury trial
requires three to four days. Summary jury trials cut the amount of
money used for juries, and they cut the time needed for the presiding judicial officers.
B.

Failureto Use Witnesses

Various commentators argue that one of the deficiencies of
the SJT is that no witnesses are called. 87 As a result, the jury verdict
is based more on the credibility of the attorneys presenting the evidence than on the actual evidence, and there is no opportunity for
cross-examination. 88 Thus the attorney who finds the SJT verdict
unfavorable might rationalize that the trial jury will find differently
after hearing his or her client or expert witness in person.89 This is
not the case in Ramsey County. Some commentators urge the use
of video depositions as part of the attorney evidentiary presenta-

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See supra Part III.
See Webber, supra note 15, at 1521.
See Denson, supra note 23, at 311; Moore, supra note 24, at 498; Posner,

supranote 7, at 374; Webber, supranote 15, at 1515-17.
88. See Moore, supranote 24, at 500.
89.

See Denson, supranote 23, at 311.
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dons in SJT. 9 I, however, have found that the limited use of live
witnesses in the SJT (usually one per side) eliminates this concern
and ensures a more realistic verdict. 1 One of the real advantages
of using limited witness testimony is the fact that the parties and
their attorneys can get feedback from the summary jurors regarding the credibility of key witnesses. In addition, attorneys are urged
to get right to the chase in the questions to their witness (usually
their client) and immediately get to the crux of the case.
C. Skewed Verdicts
Does shortened voir dire add to a skewed verdict, as Moore
and Webber argue? 92 Moore suggests that a "more biased jury may
serve at the SJT than would serve at an actual trial" due to the limited jury pool, limited number of challenges to jury members during voir dire, and reliance on a "basic information" form about the
jury members.93
I have found, however, that if the judge asks a few germane
questions of the ten prospective jurors and allows the lawyers a few,
brief follow-up questions, there is more than adequate voir dire. I
conduct voir dire as follows: Ten prospective jurors are put in the
jury box. The attorneys and the judge have the answers to the jury
questionnaire form. The judge explains the case and fashions
questions regarding the case to see if any particular juror has any
bias or prejudice. If a bias seems apparent, I let the attorneys ask
one or two follow-up questions. This is similar to the voir dire procedure in full-blown trials in most federal district courts, except
that in the federal district courts, the attorneys usually are not allowed to ask follow-up questions; rather, the judge asks them. If
this procedure is followed, usually the voir dire can be completed
in ten to fifteen minutes. It is fair and loosely based on the federal
system, where one would be hard put to argue that federal civil jury
trials foster skewed verdicts.

90. See id.
91. But see id. ("It would be a mistake to allow the calling of live witnesses because there would be inadequate control over the content of their testimony and
because it would be difficult for it to be sufficiently compressed.")
92. See Moore, supranote 24, at 500; Webber, supra note 15, at 1517.
93. Moore, supranote 24, at 500.
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D. Law and Economics
Moore also argues that the delay and expense associated with a
a
SJT, along with
1 94the fear of sanctions, cause the litigants to forego
full-blown trial. Moore argues:
[L]itigants are forced to endure the expense and delay of
preparing for and participating in SJTs with little hope of
actually reaching a settlement agreement.95
Besides the fact that Moore's argument completely lacks merit
and is unsupported by any evidence, it does not gel with the
author's experience. In Ramsey County, the SJT usually lasts a half
day. Although clearly the parties incur legal expenses, the plaintiffs attorney usually is compensated on a contingent fee. Therefore, rarely does a plaintiff incur more legal expenses due to a SJT
proceeding. The defendant usually has the wherewithal to go
through with a SJT. More often than not, the savings the parties
receive because their case settled short of a full-blown trial outweighs any expense for the SJT.
Judge Lambros also met this argument head on when he
stated that although people argue that an extra layer of expense to
the litigation process ensues:
[M]y experience has shown that the opposite is true.
Rather than adding an extra layer of expense, summary
jury trial encourages trial counsel to make a timely analysis of the case and to focus on its strength as well as its
frailties. In preparing for a summary jury trial, trial counsel must crystallize and distill their best arguments96 and
evidence for an abbreviated presentation to the jury.
Judge Spiegel has also defended any expense associated with
SJTs by stating:
The summary jury trial is an innovative settlement
mechanism with a high success rate. The procedure conserves judicial resources, provides an accurate reading of
94.
95.
96.

See Moore, supra note 24, at 503.
Id. at 517.
Lambros, supranote 1, at 626.
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what will actually happen at trial. 97

Judge Posner stated:
Settlement out of court is cheaper than litigation. Therefore, only if each disputant expects to do better in the litigation than the other disputant expects him to do are the
parties likely to fail to agree on settlement terms that
make them both consider themselves better off compared
with how they anticipate fairing in litigation.9
Therefore, the logical conclusion under the school of law and
economics is that attorney's fees, expert witnesses' fees, judicial
time, jury fees, and support staff-all of which are a form of transaction costs-will be lowered ifjudges and lawyers utilize SJTs. The
anecdotal illustrations previously set forth in this article show how
SJTs have led to settlements which led to low transaction costs.
One can readily see that the more SJTs are utilized, the more parties and their attorneys will be willing to go into binding SJTs. This
will definitely promote lower transaction costs.
In my courtroom, there is no expense to the litigant if the litigant wants a SJT and cannot afford to have a referee appointed. In
that case, the court has heard the case without any cost to the parties. Oftentimes, the court-appointed neutrals have agreed to wait
until after the case is over to require payment, so that in the case of
the plaintiff, if there is a settlement or an award, the referee can be
paid out of that award.
E.

ConstitutionalConcerns

Various arguments about the constitutionality of SJTs have
been raised. These tend to be based on concerns about the right
to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, the right to due
process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
right of equal protection under the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judicial powers under Article Three of
the Constitution. 99 The first three constitutional concerns are directed at ADR procedures generally, especially when such proceed97.
98.
99.

142 CHIC. DAILYL. BULL. No. 145 (July 24, 1996).
POSNER, supranote 25, at 541.
See Moore, supranote 24, at 501.
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ings are mandated by the courts and can result in sanctions of parties who fail to participate fully. 100 These arguments are outside the
scope of this article, as they address concerns with the mandatory
nature of ADR processes in general, not arguments against the use
of SJTs specifically. Furthermore, although Ramsey County mandates certain ADR procedures, including SJTs, it does not do so for
indigent civil defendants. And Ramsey County has yet to sanction a
party for not participating in a SJT. So far to my knowledge, none
of the mandated parties have sought appellate intervention.101
100. See id. at 501-11.
101. It is my hope that more SJTs can be heard as binding cases, however.
Professor Thomas B. Metzloff agrees, stating:
A binding SJT approach offers the potential for significant cost savings to
the litigants. Unlike a court's decision to mandate a traditional SJT on
the eve of trial, the parties' decision to employ a binding SJT could be
made early in the litigation process (perhaps even before suit is filed).
After limited discovery, the case could be tried in an abbreviated fashion
in which various procedural shortcuts-many borrowed from the typical
SJT format, such as the use of summarized evidence-could be employed. The litigants' goals in formatting the process would be more
broadly defined than in the classic SJT context, where the court-initiated
process is largely driven by an interest in shortening trial lengths. For
example, because the parties have committed the resolution of their dispute to the process, they may often be interested in providing more information to the summary jury than would be the case with the traditional SJT. Serving this interest would usually entail the limited use of
live or videotaped testimony on critical issues.
Thomas B. Metzloff, Improving the Summary Jury Trial, 77 JUDICATURE, No. 1, JulyAug. 1993, at 11. He has also stated:
A restructured SJT could perform this new role by offering litigants the
opportunity to reduce both the expense of litigation and the risks inherent in the existing jury system. The theory of the binding SJT rejects the
common assumption that the SJT process is intended for cases in which
conventional negotiations have failed. Instead, it seeks a broader role for
the process by providing an ADR option for litigants presently forced to
settle, but who would prefer a binding adjudication if the process could
be made less expensive and more predictable. A binding SJT approach
described here meets what Judge Posner has referred to as the "rational
litigant" test.
Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Trial, 41 DUKE LJ. 806, 856-57
(1992) (citing Posner, supra note 7, at 367). Posner stated: "Although emotion
and ignorance play a role in litigation, no proposed alternative is likely to work
that assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that litigants and their lawyers are irrational."
Id. (quoting Posner, supranote 7, at 367). Metzloff continued:
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In the event a case would arise before the Minnesota appellate
courts, I believe they would follow a Minnesota federal district
court case on the subject. 10 In that case, the federal magistrate
mandated a SJT but the parties strenuously objected, citing cost
concerns and the inaccuracy of any SJT verdict as major evidentiary
rulings had yet to be made, and noting that given the party's positions the possibility of settlement would be extremely remote.'O'
The district court rejected the view of the Seventh Circuit that 1 a
federal judge does not have authority to order a mandatory SJT. 04
The court found instead that the SJT proceeding was a good investment compared to the potential length of a real jury trial lasting four to six weeks, that even if it did not lead to settlement it
would benefit the case by clarifying issues for trial for the parties
and the court, that the proceeding would be closed to the public so
as to avoid premature publicity, and that "it is reasonable to require
the parties to engage in settlement efforts with some degree of intensity" in a case such as this. 05 Finally, the court noted that
"[r]esort to a totally voluntary system of the use of SJT, where the
attorneys are aware of the court's inability to compel their attendance and participation would undercut the potential efficacy of
the procedure." 06
However, one of the constitutional arguments against SJTs has
been the question that Judge Posner first posed that it may be unlikely that judges have the authority to convene ajury merely to assist the settlement process. 10 7 He further warned that 'Judges
should be cautious about instituting new forms of involuntary servi-

The process allows litigants to obtain a binding adjudication of their dispute at a reasonable cost without the risks inherent in the current jury
system. A well-designed binding SJT serves three goals: (1) it avoids the
possibly expensive and unproductive post-SJT negotiating process (as
well as the need to interview jurors after the summary trial to obtain their
subjective assessments of case); (2) it removes the distorting impact of an
outlying summary jury decision; and (3) it avoids the possibility of an expensive subsequent trial.
Id. at 856-57.
102. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn.
1988).
103. See id. at 604.
104. See id. at 606.
105. Id. at 607.
106. Id. at 608.
107. See Posner, supra note 7, at 385-86; see also Moore, supranote 24, at 515-16.
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Chief Judge Battisti picked up on this argument in the case of
Hume v. M & C Management.'0 Sitting in the same district as Judge
Lambros, the father of SJTs, Judge Battisti held that nothing in the
Jury Selection and Service Act 10 required citizens to serve as juries
on SJTs."' Given this, he found that federal judges "have no
authority to summon citizens to serve as settlement advisors, just as
they would have no authority to summon
citizens as hand servants
12
for themselves, lawyers, or litigants."'
Even so, the concerns raised by this argument of "involuntary
servitude" can be easily alleviated. This can be handled, as I have
done in a number of cases, by having the clerk of court ask prospective jurors if they would be interested in serving on a condensed case that would probably only last one to two days. In my
experience, we have received many volunteers. In the metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul, to wit Hennepin and Ramsey
Counties, where most of the SJTs are held, jurors are generally
summoned for a week at a time. If they are selected for a complex
case, they will serve for a much longer time. It has been done, and
certainly could be done in the future, where certain members of a
panel are asked who would be interested in serving on a shorter
case.
F. Right of the Litigants to a Fairand Full Trial vs. JudicialEfficiency
It is also opined that litigants' constitutional rights to a full and
fair hearing are circumvented by SJTs. " ' Maria Moore argues that
this is because the "delay and expense occasioned by participation
in the SJT may make proceedings with a full trial impractical for
some parties. " 14 This runs contrary to the author's experience.
First of all, the more SJTs that are ordered, the less calendar delay
there will be on a particular judge's docket. Summary jury trials
speed up, rather than delay, the opportunity for litigants to have
their case heard. Further, if the litigant is not satisfied with the advisory result, the litigant can demand a trial that in this author's
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Posner, supra note 7, at 386.
129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508-09.
Id. at 510.
See Moore, supra note 24, at 501-10.
Id. at517.
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experience has not been delayed.
The rationale behind the SJT does not lie in any effort by the
judiciary to put the litigants through so many hoops that they become worn out, impoverished, or both and, therefore, settle.
Rather, the rationale for a SJT lies in the fact that there exists empirical evidence of cases where SJTs take place, and there is a substantially greater chance of settling.
G. Giving Up Trial Strategy
Some lawyers express concern that an SJT requires them to
show their trial strategy prior to a trial on the merits.1 5 However,
Judge Spiegel noted that he has not observed a problem with this,
and will not allow "any surprises, blindsiding, or trial by ambush" in
any proceeding whether it involves "discovery, pretrial proceedings,
summary jury trials, [or] ...trial on the merits" anyway. ' 16 Accordingly, this argument is meritless.
H. OverstatingofEvidence by Counsel
Another concern might be that since evidence does not come
in through normal evidentiary procedures which provide for proof,
foundation, and objections, and instead is simply presented by
counsel during their arguments, such evidence could be "overstated."" 7 This is easily corrected by the exchange of all evidence
before SJT. ' In addition, Judge Spiegel has noted that in his experience, forbidding commentary by counsel during the presentaton of evidence to the jury also removes this problem." 9
V.

CONCLUSION

Through the examples and studies summarized here, we have
seen that SJTs have the potential to reduce transaction costs noticeably by reducing attorney's fees, expert witness's fees, and the
time litigants waste in lengthy trials. One of the biggest assets that
115. See id. at 498 (suggesting that lawyers might "strategize" to "withhold critical information during the SJT in order to retain an element of surprise for the
real trial" and that this causes uncertainty in evaluating the true effect of SJTs);
Spiegel, supra note 6, at 835.
116. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 835.
117. See id.; Moore, supra note 24, at 500.
118. See Spiegel, supra note 6, at 835.
119. See id.
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SJTs have had in my district is that they have reduced the civil calendar to such an extent that civil litigants can now get into court
within approximately six months of filing.
Summary jury trials also have had an effect on criminal cases in
that we now can afford to put more judges on criminal cases. As a
result, all the custody felony cases are tried within sixty days, and
out-of-custody felony cases are tried within ninety to 120 days. This
certainly lowers the transaction costs for the criminal justice system.
The accused are either acquitted, convicted, or have their charges
dismissed within a relatively short period of time; this is legally and
economically efficient.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in referring to SJTs and other
methods of alternate dispute resolution, said that, "in some areas of
the law they will become not the alternate method of resolving disputes, but the usual and customary method. 120 In addition, former
ChiefJustice Warren Burger referred to judges experimenting with
SJTs "as judicial pioneers who should be commended for their innovative programs. We need more of them in the future.'

21

By

contributing additional data, attorney and litigant views, and reallife case examples to the legal field, hopefully more judges and
practitioners will become aware of SJTs and take advantage of this
important and useful method of ADR.

120. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth, Remarks to the
Australian Bar Association, Sydney, Australia, 24-25 (Sept. 2, 1988).
121. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ALTERNATE METHODS FOR PROMOTING
SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DisTRicr COURT JUDGES 43 (1986) (quoting
ChiefJustice Warren Burger's 1984 year-end report on the judiciary).
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